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This paper presents new evidence from a 1999 survey among 500 25-26 year olds in 
Vladikavkaz, capital of North Ossetia, and a sur\>ey of forced migrants who were entering 
North Ossetia from Chechnia in 2000. The paper seeks to explain how and why Islamic fun­
damentalism is able to contribute to the destabilisation of the present-day North Caucasus de­
spite the fundamentalists being extremely small proportions of the populations in all the re­
gion's republics.
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Introduction
In the West, and in Moscow also, Islamic fundamentalism tends to be viewed as a 
threat, moreso than ever since September 11 2001. It is associated with political destabilisa­
tion, and economic and social regression, as in Iran and Afghanistan, and international ter­
rorism.
In the North Caucasus the main Islamic fundamentalist tendency is Vahhabism. Its fol­
lowers believe that only their movement will be able to unify and stabilise their region, and 
deliver economic prosperity. They believe that the evidence of history is clearly on their side, 
and, within their own region, they are in fact offering one of the more plausible solutions to 
the predicament of all the peoples. We shall see, however, not only that this solution has little 
support among the populations in the region, but also that there are very few Vahhabis. Here 
we offer an explanation as to why, despite this, Islamic fundamentalism can still be suffi­
ciently influential to be terrifying. In developing our argument we draw upon two new bodies 
of evidence: first, a 1999 survey of 500 young people in Vladikavkaz, the capital of North 
Ossetia, one of the North Caucasian republics, and comparable evidence from parallel sur­
veys among the same age group in Moscow and Dneipropetrovsk; second, an interview sur­
vey in 2000 among 50 forced emigrants from Chechnia.
* The study of 25-26 year olds cited in this paper was funded by INTAS (award 20468). The study 
of forced migrants from Chechnia was funded by the Russian Humanities Scientific Foundation (award 
98-03-04434). Paper to be presented to ISSA XV, World Congress of Sociology, Brisbane, Australia, July 
7-13, 2002, RC 05, Session 10. Ethnic conflict and their relevance for the contemporary social sciences.
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The Muvahhids in Arabia
Vahhabism has its origins in mid-eighteenth century Central Arabia. Its founder was 
Mohammed Ibn Abd-al Vahhab. Hence the term Vahhabism, though in Arabia his followers 
have always been called Muvahhids (adherents of unity).
Eighteenth century Arabia was splintered into numerous emirates, all of which, at that 
time, were threatened either by the Ottoman Turks or the Iranians. The emirates needed to 
unite in order to survive, and Vahhab and his followers urged unity. Vahhab branded the 
Turks and Iranians as unfaithful and proclaimed a jihad (holy war) against them. Vahhab and 
his supporters sought to cleanse Islam in Arabia of “pagan vestiges” such as magic and sor­
cery, and also so-called “novelties” such as the cults associated with revered tombs in some 
oases. Anything that divided Islam was opposed. Vahhab censured luxury and demanded to­
tal observance of Islamic commandments including five-fold daily prayer, pilgrimages to 
Mecca, and the prohibition of usury, prostitution and sodomy (Mengin, 1823).
Central Arabia's emirs were not immediately sympathetic to these teachings, but one, 
Mohammed Ibn Saud of Darija, formed a holy alliance with the teacher. Darija thus became 
the centre of Muvahhidism (Rihani, 1928). Missionaries were despatched to make converts. 
Adversaries were terrorised. Converts were welcomed in Darija where they were generously 
clothed and fed; a policy towards converts which continues to the present day.
As a result of all this, Darija became a centre of political power which united several 
emirates (Niebuhr, 1780). Unity was then extended to other regions of Arabia including the 
sacred cities of Mecca and Medina which, ever since, has enabled the Saudi leaders to claim 
a kind of world pre-eminence within Islam. By the end of the eighteenth century the son and 
successor of the original Muvahhid ruler, Abd-al Aziz, had repelled the Turks and invaded 
Iran. Religious unity had therefore fulfilled its political promise.
Following Vahhab's death, Arabia's emirs appropriated spiritual as well as political 
power. The religious Muvahhids were confined to roles as judges and dogma teachers 
(Philby, 1922; Wallin, 1854). Thus decadence spread throughout the region. At any rate, this 
is the interpretation of history favoured by present-day believers. The Darija-based state was 
eventually smashed by invading Turks and Egyptians. In the nineteenth century there were 
attempts to establish a second Saudi state under the old politico-religious banner, but this 
state failed to regain its predecessor’s territory and might.
However, Muvahhidism underwent a renaissance after 1910. This was against a back­
ground of European entry to the region (Dickson, 1950). Europe sought trade, and especially 
oil, which made some emirs rich, but the introduction of the motor car led to the collapse of 
the bedouin's main occupation, namely camel breeding (Raswan, 1937). The backlash was a 
renewed search for unity in order to repel the unfaithful, their artifacts and their culture. In­
dependent emirs and sheiks were interned by the Sauds. Preachers were once again sent into 
Arabia's villages. New rural “colonies” were thereby established, some of which became new 
hotbeds of Muvahhidism. As formerly, converts were rewarded, this time with allowances 
from the Saudi treasury. Thus, in the 1920s, Saudi-Arabia became a single kingdom which 
has endured up to our present time.
In early-twentieth century Arabia the Muvahhids insisted on absolute observance of Is­
lamic rules. They adopted a distinctive dress, the white turban, and restricted contact with 
the unfaithful. They forbade eating with, and even greeting them (Nallino, 1939). The legiti­
macy of the Saudi state has always had a religious base. Hence its enforcement of Islamic 
commandments. Even in the late-twentieth century Westerners were still (occasionally) being 
flogged, usually for alcohol offences. There have been some blatant departures from strict 
fundamentalism - the adoption of “Western” cars, radios, guns, aeroplanes and so forth - 
and the Saudi rulers cannot claim to eschew luxury. Nevertheless, their legitimacy is unlikely
60
Dzutsev, K.. Pcrshitz, A., Roberts, K.: Ethnic Divisions.. Revija za sociologiju. Vol XXXIII. (2002). No 1-2: 59-69
to face a powerful internal challenge while the kingdom remains united and basically Islamic, 
and excludes what are now regarded as the main symbols of Western culture such as alcohol 
and “naked” women. The Muvahhid “project” in Arabia has evidently (at least in believers' 
eyes) succeeded in delivering security to the people, and lifting them out of their earlier pov­
erty.
Vahhabism is the North Caucasus
During the twentieth century Vahhabism spread from Arabia into other near-east and 
middle-east countries, to Indonesia, to Central Asia and to the Caucasus. The teachings were 
taken into the latter region by missionaries from Arabia, Jordan and Pakistan. In the Cauca­
sus the aims of Vahhabism have been the same as in Arabia: to create a unitary, centralised 
Islamic state which will be able to withstand its enemies. This strength has been regarded as 
dependent on internal unity. So in the Caucasus the aim of Vahhabism has been to unite all 
the peoples - different ethnic groups in the Caucasus rather than the separate emirates in 
Arabia.
Vahhabism has been present in the Caucasus since the 1920s, but under Stalin and his 
immediate successors the movement was suppressed ruthlessly. This changed in the 1980s 
with the advent of glasnost, and barriers to the propagation of the faith all but disappeared in 
most of the region with the lifting of Soviet power in the 1990s.
In the present-day Caucasus the influence of Vahhabism is out of proportion to the rel­
atively small number of believers who live strictly according to the teachings. The influence 
of the movement in the North Caucasus has been magnified by some of its peoples' affinity 
with Islam, but even moreso by the political and economic conditions in the 1990s and subse­
quently. Daghestan is generally regarded as Vahhabism's main hotbed in the region. Here 
around 10 percent of the population are estimated to believers. The second main hotbed is 
said to be Karachai-Circassia, but here there are estimated to be no more than 300 Vahhabis. 
In North Ossetia there are no more than 40, but approximately 20 percent of the people 
“think of” themselves as muslims.
All of these republics are multi-ethnic. Daghestan is a land of high mountains and deep 
gorges, and contains at least 30 main ethnic groups (some divided into sub-ethnicities). 
There would be even more ethnic groups in Daghestan had there not been some mergers: 
between the eight former groups who are now Avars, the four who are now Lezgins, and the 
three who are now Kumyks. These particular mergers have been aided by pre-existent lin­
guistic similarities (Lavrov, 1958; Volkov and Sergeeva, 1995). Karachai-Circassia is the 
home of just four main ethnic groups plus Russians most of whom are of the Cossack 
sub-ethnicity (Government of Karachai-Circassia, 1998).
Vahhabism aims to unite all these ethnicities. It insists that religion is above and must 
take precedence over ethnic, national and tribal divisions. The entire population in the North 
Caucasus is currently searching for unity. The region desperately needs a new cement. Peo­
ple fear the consequences of their divisions, especially in the absence of Russian power. They 
fear that unless unity is achieved warfare will engulf the region, as it has on so many occa­
sions in the past, and in recent times in Chechnia, in Georgia (in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia), and in Nagorno Karabakh. All the ethnicities have historical memories, and some 
have twentieth century experience, of exterminations and ex-patriations. Vahhabism has a 
particularly strong appeal where these fears are most intense. For example, in 
Karachai-Circassia most Vahhabis are Karachais, a people with memories of deportation un­
der Stalin. In Daghestan the Nogais region is a particular hotbed of Vahhabism. Kumyks 
(from the mountains) were settled on the Nogais plain by Stalin. Chechen Akins have now 
returned to what they regard as their land. The situation is explosive.
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There are two wings in the present-day Vahhabi movement in the North Caucasus. 
“Radicals” advocate open warfare against all non-Muslims. The “reformist” wing has far 
more supporters. It is led (spiritually) by the Imam of all Russia who advocates a “jihad” via 
a 20 year programme of propaganda (teaching, interpreting the Koran, and distributing liter­
ature) and building mosques.
Vahhabism (the reformist tendency at any rate) is legal in the Russian Federation. De­
spite this, the entire movement was declared illegal by the President of Chechnia in the 
mid-1990s. Previously Chechnia had not been among the hotbeds of Vahhabism. Rather, it 
was the leading example of divisions leading to conflicts between ethnic and sub-ethnic 
groups that the rest of the Caucasus feared. Vahhabism's prohibition in Chechnia had exactly 
the opposite to the intended consequences. In 1998 a military unit that had converted to 
Vahhabism attacked government forces. The rebels were quashed and formally disbanded, 
but in practice they simply dispersed to villages, became a cause celebre among Vahhabis 
throughout the region, and have subsequently received constant support from Daghestan.
Reformist and radical Vahhabis all have the same objective (unity) for the North Cau­
casus. Their leaders adopt traditional titles: they are emirs and sheiks (the emirs' subordi­
nates). They are all working towards the Islamicisation of the entire region and the creation 
of a single Islamic state covering the entire territory. They are critical of mainstream Muslim 
clergy for (allegedly) ignoring the Koran and Sunna, and for their digressions from sharia 
(Islamic law). Sharia justice in the Caucasus can be truly medieval. In 1998 the kidnappers of 
a Daghestan girl were burnt alive (as stipulated by sharia). Vahhabis are against tobacco, al­
cohol and drugs. They favour large families and forbid contraception and abortion. They are 
against invasion by Western culture, but, as in Saudi-Arabia, they are willing to use its arti­
facts like guns.
Calls for a return to Islam's fundamentals and the creation of an Islamic North Cauca­
sian state are combined with vitriolic criticism of the existing state system. Neither Moscow 
nor the region's own governments are able to deliver even physical security. Politics and pub­
lic administration are condemned as bedevilled by bribery and corruption. The break-up of 
the centrally-planned Soviet economy has cost most people their livelihoods. Poverty has be­
come widespread. The situation in the North Caucasus since the 1980s has been analogous to 
the predicament of Saudi-Arabia's bedouins following the collapse of camel breeding earlier 
in the twentieth century.
Vahhabism is seeking basically the same solution to the problems of the North Cauca­
sus that worked in Saudi-Arabia earlier-on. It seeks to unite the entire North Caucasus under 
the teachings of Islam, and to create an effective centralised government for the region 
which will deliver security and prosperity.
The members of the movement who have become preachers and convert-seekers, and 
who live in accordance with all the commandments, are still extremely small in number, but 
their influence, the scale of their at least acquiescent support, can be far greater. As applied 
earlier-on in Saudi-Arabia, converts are treated generously with modest (certainly in Western 
terms) financial gifts. The Vahhabis' critics sometimes explain conversions in these terms. 
Maybe this applies to some of the Russians in the region who have converted to Islam, and 
who have then become Vahhabis. However, this overlooks the appeal of the message to peo­
ple for whom, it appears, there is simply no other solution to their own, or their region's, 
problems.
Young people in Vladikavkaz
None of the Caucasian republics are uniformly, or even overwhelmingly, muslim. Like 
the Balkans, the Caucasus has a specific kind of religious geography. Specific settlements and
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regions converted to Islam centuries ago, sometimes willingly, but more often coerced by the 
Turks. Subsequently the relevant populations have developed as distinct ethnic, or 
sub-ethnic, populations. Other settlements and regions have always been mainly (orthodox) 
Christian. During communism the ethnic Russian populations expanded everywhere. Some of 
the less compliant local groups were removed (to Siberia). Nowadays the Christians and mus- 
lims throughout the region are most likely to be the so-called “ethnic” varieties, meaning 
that they do not balance in the theology. During 70 years of communism religious belief and 
practice declined. So nowadays both Christians and muslims are mostly bearers of the histori­
cally transmitted cultures rather than religious in the everyday sense. In most cases their reli­
giosity is comparable to that of “ethnic Christian” atheists in Western Europe.
Vahabbism is capable of destabilising the region despite, rather than on account of, 
most people's religious beliefs. According to the results of our 1999 survey of 500 25-26 year 
olds (the principal aim being to discover how young people were being affected by the re­
forms), roughly two-thirds of the population of Vladikavkaz, capital of North Ossetia, is 
Ossetian by nationality. Just over a quarter of the respondents were ethnically Russian (see 
Table 1). According to official statistics, roughly a fifth of the Vladikavkaz population, and 
around a third of the Ossetians, are muslim (usually only in the ethnic sense). In the parallel 
surveys that were conducted simultaneously in Moscow (capital of Russia) and Dneipro- 
petrovsk (a major Ukraine city), the levels of regular church and mosque attendance were 
similar to the level in Vladikavkaz, and in other cities in the Caucasus, Eastern, Central and 
Western Europe (see Roberts et al., 2000): between 7 and 11 percent were attending at least 
once a month. Vladikavkaz was certainly not a seething hotbed of Vahabbism or any other 




Russia 94 27 19
Ukrainian 4 2 79
Ossetian - 65 -
Other 6 6 2
Table 2. Labour Market Outcomes
Moscow Vlad Dneip
% % %
Succeeding 37 - 6
Getting-by 35 48 58
Floundering 29 52 36
Economic conditions in Vladikavkaz were harsher than in either Moscow or Dneipro- 
petrovsk. In addition to the collapse of the communist economy, the Caucasus had suffered 
economically from the general political disintegration and breakdown of law and order. We 
have classified the samples of young people into three broad groups according to their 
achievements in the labour market (see Table 2). Those described as “succeeding” were in 
full-time jobs and were earning in excess of $100 a month (using the prevailing market ex­
change rates). Those who were “getting by” were earning just $50-100 per month in their 
full-time jobs. The group described as “floundering” were either earning less than $50 in 
their full-time jobs, or were employed part-time, just casually, or unemployed. Over a half of
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the Vladikavkaz sample fell into the floundering group. Economic conditions were extremely 
difficult. However, while lagging behind Moscow, the Vladikavkaz respondents' self-assessed 
material well-being was not inferior to the level recorded in Dneipropetrovsk, and the same 
applied to the respondents' consumer assets (cars, PCs, VCRs and satellite TV connections), 
and to their participation in leisure-time activities (see Tables 3, 4 and 5). Within the latter 
we can see clear evidence of the muslim-influenced culture in the North Caucasus - levels of 
tobacco and alcohol consumption were much lower than in the other two areas.







Good 1 17 5 5
2 49 47 26
3 21 19 30
4 11 24 26




Has the use of:
Car 40 21 15
PC 39 9 8
VCR 76 59 30
Satcllitc/cable TV 8 8 2
Table 5. Leisure activities
Moscow Vlad Dneip
% % %
Participates at least once
a month
Play sport 51 40 38
Bars, cafcs, restaurants 40 29 27
Nightclubs, discos 32 24 21
Cinema, theatre 32 10 13
Watch live sport 7 18 9
Smoke 43 27 42
Drink alcohol 56 21 43
Church 7 11 11
There is further evidence of muslim influence, but equally of pan-Caucasian traditions, 
in the Vladikavkaz sample's family behaviour and values. The 25-26 year olds were less likely 
than their Moscow and Dneipropetrovsk counterparts to be married or cohabiting, or to 
have children, and they were also less likely to have moved-out of their parents' homes (see 
Table 6). This was not due to local housing shortages. Rather it reflects the Caucasian norm 
of living in multi-generation households. It is perhaps noteworthy that although they were
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less likely to have already become parents, the young people in Vladikavkaz who had done so 
were actually more likely to be single parents than the young parents in the other two re­
gions. The other evidence of cultural distinctiveness is that in Vladikavkaz there was more 
support for patriarchy - the husband acting as the key decision-maker in the family - and 
more opposition to equally-distributed housework, than in Moscow or Dneipropetrovsk (see 
Table 7).








Single 3 4 4
Married/cohabiting 8 3 3
Couple and Kids 13 7 14
Single parent 1 1 2
Family dwelling
Single 47 64 35
Married/cohabiting 13 6 10
Couple and Kids 12 9 27
Single parent 3 6 7
Table 7. Family values
Moscow Vlad Dneip
% % %
Who should take key decisions:
Husband 37 58 44
Wife 3 2 2
Jointly 60 40 54
Agree or strongly agree that 
men and women should do 




State that it is possible or very 
possible that will migrate:
Within country 8 24 16
to another country 9 21 14
Agree or strongly agree:
want to go to the West 21 35 19
Our questions indicated a higher propensity to migrate from Vladikavkaz than from ei­
ther of the other two areas (see Table 8). In Vladikavkaz the young people were more likely 
to regard it as possible or certain that they would quit their home region, and to express a de­
sire to work in the West. This was not because they were particularly pro-Western or unpatri­
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otic. Quite the reverse. A higher proportion of the Vladikavkaz respondents were prepared 
to fight for their country than in either of the other areas (see Table 9). This begs the ques­
tion of exactly which country they would fight for, and who they expected to fight against. 
These details could not be addressed adequately in a questionnaire that was designed for use 
in three different parts of the former USSR. However, it is clear from the samples' other re­
sponses, and from our wider knowledge about public opinion in North Ossetia and other 
Caucasian countries, that most young people in Vladikavkaz envisaged that any fighting 
would be to defend the Russian Federation. They were more likely than their Moscow and 
Dneipropetrovsk counterparts to believe that the disintegration of the USSR had entailed 
too many disadvantages, more-or-less equally likely to favour closer relations between CIS 
countries, and less likely to seek closer relationships with the West (see Table 9).
Table 9. International relations
Moscow Vlad Dneip
% % %
Prepared to fight for country 40 54 28
Views on break-up of USSR:
Good 7 7 11
Not sure, pros and cons 72 48 53
Too many disadvantages 21 45 36
Favour closer ties with:
Other CIS countries 79 79 87
West 76 66 85
Yugoslavia 44 45 38









City centre 23 33 20
Where live 22 37 26
Night
City centre 29 41 41




Very/quite interested in politics 20 30 20
Voting intentions
Specific party 23 29 16
Not sure 55 41 61
Definitely will not vote 22 30 23
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The higher propensity to migrate from Vladikavkaz would have been due partly to the 
especially difficult economic conditions, but the young people knew that there were similar 
difficulties in most places where they were able to settle legally. The specific problems of 
living in the North Caucasus owed more to the exceptional political and civil disintegration. 
Throughout the former communist world, people comment on the higher crime rates, and 
how their towns and cities have become less safe. These feelings were more pronounced in 
Vladikavkaz than in Moscow or Dneipropetrovsk (see Table 10). Expressed interest in poli­
tics was higher in Vladikavkaz than in either of the other two areas, and a higher propor­
tion supported, and intended to vote for, a specific political party. Conditions were tending 
to politicise Vladikavkaz's young people. But Vladikavkaz also had the highest proportion 
who had definitely decided not to vote for anyone (see Table 11). They had given-up on 
politics.
Had they believed that the strategy was likely to succeed, then, as in Chechnia (see be­
low), the majority in Vladikavkaz, Christians and muslims alike, would almost certainly 
have backed local politicians who would have collaborated with Russia in restoring order to 
the North Caucasus. But Russia was manifestly failing, and was probably unable, to achieve 
this. This is the North Caucasian context wherein small minorities have been able to mobi­
lise wider (though still minority) support for their preferred solutions to the region's prob­
lems.
Chechens' views
In September 2000 the North-Ossetian Centre for Sociological Research conducted a 
small-scale study at the checkpoint between the Chechen Republic and the Mozodokski dis­
trict of North Ossetia-Alania where 50 Chechens were interviewed (Dzutsev, 2001). They 
were all crossing the border (out of Chechnia) and were in possession of forced migrant cer­
tificates (issued by the Russians). They were people whose dwellings had been destroyed and 
who were escaping from the fighting in their republic. They had good reasons to distrust Rus­
sia. So despite having the legal right to settle anywhere in the Russian Federation, and de­
spite the likely material advantages of doing so, only a fifth wanted to leave Chechnia indefi­
nitely.
The 50 respondents in this study cannot be treated as a representative sample of 
Chechens. Even so, their views on the political situation in Chechnia, and preferred solu­
tions, can perhaps be treated as indicative. Only 12 percent wanted Chechnia to become a 
completely independent state. It is true that another 20 percent favoured Chechnia being 
split with the lowlands remaining in the Russian Federation, while the highlands (where 
anti-Russian fighters had their bases) became independent, but 60 percent wanted the whole 
of Chechnia to remain within Russia. Just 8 percent wanted the people of Chechnia to be 
obliged to live by sharia law.
The vast majority of Chechens (as in all the other Caucasian republics) do not share the 
Vahabbis' aspiration. However, few of the respondents in either of the studies referred to 
above had any confidence in any politicians solving their region's problems. Forty-one per­
cent of the Chechen migrants said that no politician could resolve the situation. A similar 
percentage said that there was no politician who truly represented the interests of the 
Chechen people. The politician who received the most “votes” was Gantamirov (14 percent). 
Khazbulatov (the Russia-appointed leader) had 8 percent and Maskhadov (the locally 
elected leader) had just 2 percent, like Putin. This lack of confidence in all politicians indi­
cates the extreme socio-political disintegration in Chechnia which has accompanied the 
run-down of local industries and the destruction of the physical environment. Most of the 
Chechens feared rather than sought independence.
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Conclusion
All the peoples of the Caucasus have ambivalent attitudes towards Russia. On the one 
hand, in the eyes of devout Muslims, the (orthodox Christian) Russians are unbelievers who 
must be repelled and eventually either converted or defeated. Historically, and up the pres­
ent-day, Russian power in the region has been experienced as oppressive and divisive. Czarist 
and communist policy in the region, and in Central Asia, was to divide and rule. On the other 
hand, the periods of relative peace and security that the North Caucasus has experienced 
have been due to Russian power and protection. And Russian language is one of the few 
links between all the ethnic groups (Christian and muslim) throughout the region. If pres­
ent-day Russia could deliver peace and prosperity to the region, the influence of Vahhabism 
would surely subside.
For practical purposes, Russia has just two options in the region. First, it could make 
Chechnia (up to now the main site of opposition to Russia's rule) independent, in which case 
Chechnia's neighbours would demand protection behind a “Chinese wall”, a military cordon 
sanitaire. This solution would probably be favoured by world opinion. Russia would be less 
exposed to criticism for human rights abuses. The problem is that this solution does not ap­
peal to most Chechens, nor to most of the other peoples in other parts of the Russian Feder­
ation in the North Caucasus. Russia's sole other option is to try to bring the situation in 
Chechnia under direct control. This has been Putin's policy. The problem here is that the so­
lution is not working, and, from the interview findings presented above, it would appear that 
few Chechens (or members of other populations in the region) believe that it will work.
Maybe the economic problems in the North Caucasus that have followed the break-up 
of the USSR are no greater than in many other parts of the Russian Federation, but the loss 
of security, the constant threat to all the people's lives and property, is distinctive. Muslims, 
even the so-called ethnic muslims who have never previously worshipped, and, indeed, whose 
families effectively lapsed many, many years ago, may be persuaded to believe that there is 
an Islamic solution to their problems - a solution which has already worked for muslims in 
other countries. Maybe, as a matter of plain fact, political stability and physical security if not 
economic development are more likely to be delivered through a single North Caucasian 
state, an Islamic state, than under present conditions - a multitude of ethnic groups situated 
on the lawless periphery of a decaying Russian empire.
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Članak predstavlja nove činjenice koje se temelje na anketi iz 1999. go­
dine. Anketa je obuhvatila 500 osoba dobi 25-26 godina u Vladikavkazu, 
glavnome gradu Sjeverne Osetije, te prisilne migrante koji su došli u Sjevernu 
Osetiju iz Cečenije tijekom 2000. godine. Cilj je članka objasniti kako je i 
zašto islamski fundamentalizam u stanju doprinijeti destabilizaciji današnjeg 
Sjevernog Kavkazja usprkos tome što fundamentalisti predstavljaju veoma 
malen dio populacije u svim zemljama u regiji.
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